[B]oth the philosophers and theologians agree, that the prince who seizes the state with force and arms, and with no legal right, no public, civic approval, may be killed by anyone and deprived of his life and position. Since he is a public enemy and, afflicts his fatherland with every evil, since truly, and in a proper sense, he is clothed with the title and character of tyrant, he may be removed by any means and gotten rid of by as much violence as he used in seizing his power. 9 In the nineteenth century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose crimes were "political" was established in Europe and in Latin America. This principle is known as the "political offense exception" to extradition. But a specific exemption from the protection of the political offense exception--in effect, an exception to the exception--was made for the assassins of heads of state and for attempted regicides. At the 1937 Convention for the Prevention (1648 
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and Repression of Terrorism, the murder of a head of state, or of any family member of a head of state, was formally designated as a criminal act of terrorism. " The so-called attentat" clause, which resulted from an attempt on the life of French Emperor Napoleon III, and later widened in response to the December 9, 1985 , the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and conventions. See United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doe. A/40/53 (1985) .
11. The "attentat" clause, included in many treaties, provides that the killing of the head of a foreign government or a member of his family, is not to be considered as a political offense. Some treaties extend the exclusion to any murder or to attempts on any life. Here, the political offense exception to extradition is excluded wherever any killing has taken place. In the absence of an attentat clause in a particular treaty, a state may refuse to extradite persons requested by another state on the ground that the crime in question was political. According to the European Convention on Extradition (Dec. 13, 1957, Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 24:) , Article 3, paragraph 3, "The taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offense for the purposes of this Convention." Most extradition treaties deny extradition of persons accused or convicted of relative political offenses, i.e. offenses involving one or several common crimes connected with a political act. Assassination is an example of such an offense. The courts of particular states solve the problem of applicability of non-extradition of political criminals by ascertaining the degree of connection between the common crime and the political act. Whether or not the degree of connection required for the act is to be regarded as political, and thus nonextraditable, depends entirely upon the particular test adopted by each individual state. There are three fundamental tests here: (1) the "incidence test" of Anglo-American law, which requires that the crime be part of, or incidental to, a political revolt or disturbance (although Anglo-American decisions involving East European refugees have indicated that extradition will be denied even in the absence of a political revolt or disturbance when the possibility of political persecution can reasonably be demonstrated); (2) the "political objective test" of French law, which requires that the crime be directed against the political organization or structure of the state; and (3) the "political motivation test" of Swiss law, which requires that the crime be assessed in light of the predominant surrounding circumstances and especially the motivations of the offender. A number of major treaties in force stipulate that, for purposes of extradition, political offenses shall not include crimes against humanity, certain crimes of war identified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and comparable violations of the laws of war not already provided for in these conventions.
[Vol. 13:3 assassination of President James Garfield in the United States, limited the political offense exception in international law to preserve social order. Murder of a head of state or members of the head of state's family was thus designated as a common crime, and this designation has been incorporated into Article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. Yet, we are always reminded of the fundamental and ancient right to tyrannicide, especially in the post-Holocaust/post-Nuremberg world order. 2 It follows that one could argue persuasively under international law that the right to tyrannicide is still overriding and that the specific prohibitions in international treaties are not always binding.
From the standpoint of international law, assassination can become an international crime (possibly an instance of terrorism), when it is carried out against a state official, by a national of the same state and within the territory of that state, only where the assassin flees to another state and requests for extradition are issued and/or where the assassin receives assistance from another state. If, however, the assassination is carried out by a national of another state, whether the location of the killing is the territory of the victim, the territory of the perpetrator or some other state altogether, it is immediately a matter of international law. Although, as we shall soon see, such an assassination is almost always a crime under international law it could conceivably be an instance of a very limited right of "humanitarian intervention." 3 For this to be the case, however, it would be necessary, inter alia, that the victim had been guilty of egregious crimes against human rights, that these crimes were generally recognized and widely-documented, and that no other means existed to support the restoration of basic human rights.
To this point, we have been dealing with assassination as tyrannicide, with the killing of a head of state or high official by a national of the same state. We have seen that the support for such forms of assassination can be 
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found in certain established traditions in political philosophy but that there is virtually no support in the prevailing international law of extradition. 4 Although some treaties are vague enough that such assassination might be interpreted as a political offense, and therefore not subject to extradition requests, others subscribe to the attentat principle, which provides a specific exception to the exception-in cases involving assassination of heads of state or their families.
Another possible line of support for assassination as tyrannicide can be extrapolated from the current international law of human fights. " Despite the existence of a well-developed, and precisely codified regime of human rights protections, victims of human rights abuse in particular states have little, if any, redress under international law. Indeed, in the absence of an effective centralized enforcement capability, 6 international law relies upon insurgency 7 and humanitarian intervention" as the ultimate guarantors of essential human rights. It follows that where humanitarian intervention cannot be reasonably expected, individuals within states have only themselves to provide for proper enforcement of their codified human rights. What about "humanitarian intervention" and assassination? Can agents of one state legally assassinate officials of other states under the rules of humanitarian intervention? Or is such assassination always a self-evident violation of international law in the present world order? 9 To a certain extent, the answers to these questions depend upon the absence or presence of a condition of belligerency (war) between the states involved." In the absence of this condition, assassination of political figures legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations. 18. While the theory of international law still oscillates between an individualist conception of the State and a universalist conception of humanity, the post-World War II regime of treaties, conventions, and declarations concerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a reasonably broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It is the very purpose of this regime to legitimize an allocation of competences that favors the natural rights of humankind over any particularistic interests of state. As violations of essential human rights are now incontestably within the ambit of global responsibility, the subjectivism of State primacy has been unambiguously subordinated to the enduring primacy of international justice.
19. The concept of "world order" as an organizing dimension of academic inquiry and as a normative goal of international law has its contemporary intellectual origins in the work of 20. Under international law, the question of whether or not a state of war actually exists between states is often ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a declaration of war was a necessary condition before "formal" war could be said to exist. Hugo Grotius, for example, divided wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared wars, which were not. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. III, chs. III, V, and XI (1625). By the beginning of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains only after a conclusive 20031 in another state may represent the crime of aggression or the crime of terrorism. Regarding aggression, Article 1 of the 1974 U.N. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression defines this crime, as "the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."'" In view of the binding rule of nonintervention codified in the Charter" that would normally be violated by transnational assassination, such killing would generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that transnational assassination constitutes an example of "armed force," the criminalization, as aggression, of such activity may also be extrapolated from Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression,
[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute primafacie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may in conformity with the Charter conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances ....
Let us now turn to the status of transnational assassination under international law when a condition of war exists between the states involved. According to Article 23(b) of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land: "It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously, individuals declaration of war by one of the parties, was codified by Hague Convention II. More precisely, this convention stipulated that hostilities must not commence without "previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. See Hague Convention III, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 1907, art. 1, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437 . Currently, of course, declaration of war may be tantamount to declarations of international criminality (because of the criminalization of aggression by authoritative international law), and it could be a jurisprudential absurdity to tie a state of war to formal declarations of belligerency. It follows that a state of war may exist without formal declarations, but only if there is an armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one of these states considers itself at war. 26. There are many sources that point to the convergence of national and international law. According to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, "All treaties made.., under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land .... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Although Article VI refers exclusively to treaties, the process of incorporation has also been extended by several decisions of the Supreme Court to international law in general. As this means that all of the international rules against assassination are now the law of the United States, any attempt to modify prohibitions against assassination would also appear to be in violation of American municipal law. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there are certain circumstances where "Higher Law" and other peremptory expectations of justice may be overriding.
27. Under U.S. law, assassination is prohibited at Executive Order 12,333 of the United States (Dec. 4, 1981) (1946) . From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is the case because these obligations represent not only current normative obligations of international law, but also the higher law obligations engendered by the American political tradition. By its codification of the principle that fundamental human rights are not an internal question for each State, but an imperious postulate of the international community, the Nuremberg obligations represent a point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and the jurisprudentialethical foundations of the American Republic.
30. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The torturer has becomelike the pirate and slave trader before him -Hostes humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."). Id. at 890.
31. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between the states in the fight against crime. It is mentioned in the Corpus Juris Civilis; GROTIUS, supra note 20, bk. II, ch. 20; and in EMERICH VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS bk. I, ch.
19 (1758). The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See Geneva Convention (I) [Vol. 13:3 civilian, who commits an act that constitutes a crime under international law, is responsible for the crime and is liable to punishment. 32 Paragraph 501 of the same Field Manual, based upon the well-known judgment of Japanese General Yamashita, stipulates that any U.S. government official who had actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control were complicit in war crimes and failed to take necessary steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime. 3 And Paragraph 510 denies the defense of "act of state" to such alleged criminals by providing that, though a person who committed an act constituting an international crime may have acted as head of state or as a responsible government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for that act.
These facts notwithstanding, there are circumstances wherein the expectations of the authoritative human rights/counterterrorist regime must override the ordinary prohibitions against transnational assassination -both the prohibitions concerning conditions of peace and conditions of war. The most apparent of such circumstances are those involving genocide 35 and related crimes against humanity. 36 If, after all, the assassination of a Hitler 37 or a Pol Pot could save thousands or even millions of innocent people from torture and murder -it would be a far greater crime not to attempt such an assassination than to actually carry it out. 37. According to Franz Neumann, "[if one analyzes the reaction of public opinion to the attempt on Hitler's life (July 20, 1944) one is struck by the fact that the right to assassinate him was never questioned by the Western world, which merely complained of the lack of its success." Franz Neuman, On The Limits of Justifiable Disobedience in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 150 (1957) .
38. Although the reasonableness of such assassination might be based entirely on the expectations of Nullum crimen sine poena. "No crime without a punishment," it would be substantially greater where particularly egregious crimes are still underway and/or are still being planned. Here assassination would represent an expression of humanitarian intervention and/or anticipatory self-defense.
Yet, our real objection to Saddam Hussein has little or nothing to do with his brutal pre and post-war reigns of terror in Iraq. 39 When Saddam destroyed large numbers of Kurds and other allegedly dissident Iraqis before and after his takeover of Kuwait, there was barely a murmur in Washington. 40 Indeed, the first Bush administration and certain members of Congress deliberately-overlooked these monstrous violations of human rights in the presumed interests of an American Realpolitik.
'
Why, precisely, might we now seek to rid the world of this particular tyrant? Since "humanitarian intervention" may not apply, what grounds for assassination, if any, exist under international law? 42 To answer this question codification of the international law of human rights, has sometimes been associated with increased limits on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow from the greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the Charter system of international law, especially the broad prohibition contained in Article 2 (4). Yet, while it cannot be denied that humanitarian intervention might be used as a pretext for naked aggression, it is also incontestable that a too-literal interpretation of 2 (4) would summarily destroy the entire corpus of normative protection for human rights--a corpus that is coequal with "peace" as the central [Vol. 13:3 ASSASSINATING SADDAM HUSSEIN authoritatively, we should now consider the idea of assassination as anticipatory self-defense. 43 International law is not a suicide pact. The right of self-defense by forestalling an attack was already established by Hugo Grotius in Book II of The Law of War and Peace in 1625." 4 Recognizing the need for "present danger" and threatening behavior that is "imminent in a point of time," Grotius indicates that self defense is to be permitted not only after an attack has already been suffered, but also in advance -where "the deed may be anticipated." 45 Or as he says a bit further on in the same chapter: "It be lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill ... "
Let us recall here also Pufendorf's argument in On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law:
Where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided that there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall overpower objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the important nexus between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the former is very much dependent upon widespread respect for human dignity, a too-literal interpretation of 2 (4) might well impair the prospects for long-term security. It must be widely understood that the Charter does not prohibit all uses of force and that certain uses are clearly permissible in pursuit of basic human rights. Notwithstanding, its attempt to bring greater centralization to legal processes in world politics, the Charter system has not impaired the long-standing right of individual States to act on behalf of the international legal order. In the continuing absence of effective central authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the legal community of humankind must continue to allow, indeed, must continue to require humanitarian intervention by individual States. 
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his slower assailant. And for defense, it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at him.
46
But what particular strategies and tactics may be implemented as appropriate instances of anticipatory self-defense? Do they include assassination? The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modem origins in the Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule (a rebellion that aroused sympathy and support in the American border states). 47 Following this case, the serious threat of an armed attack has generally been taken to justify militarily defensive action. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an actual attack. Here, military response to a threat was judged permissible so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 48 Today, some scholars argue that the customary right of anticipatory selfdefense articulated by the Caroline has been overridden by the specific language at Article 51 of the UN Charter. 4 In this view, Article 51 fashions a new and far more restrictive statement of self-defense, one that does rely on the literal qualifications contained in the expression "if an armed attack occurs." This interpretation ignores that international law cannot compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even lethal first strike before acting to protect itself. The argument against the restrictive view of self defense is reinforced by the apparent weakness of the Security Council in offering collective security against an aggressor -a weakness that is especially apparent in the case of Iraq.
But we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate expression of anticipatory self-defense. To an extent, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular preemptive strategy. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or biological or other highly destructive form [Vol. 13:3 ASSASSINATING SADDAM HUSSEIN of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly or even especially law-enforcing behavior.
Of course, for this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state (in our deliberations, Saddam Hussein). Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality" and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point persuasively to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare. And fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully-calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harms to civilian 5 populations than would alternative forms of anticipatory selfdefense.
Significantly, the current Bush administration is already on record as favoring a broadened concept of anticipatory self-defense. On September 20, 2002 , the President issued The National Security Strategy for the United States of America. 52 This new American doctrine asserts that traditional notions of deterrence will not work against the new kind of enemy. "We must," says the document, "adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." 53 This timely and essential "adaptation" means nothing less than striking first against particularly dangerous adversaries whenever necessary.
Should this broadened idea of anticipatory self-defense include assassination? In view of President Bush's insistent allegations that Saddam 50. The principle of proportionality has its origins in the Biblical Lex Talionis (law of exact retaliation). The "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" expression is found in three separate passages of the Torah. In contemporary international law, the principle of proportionality can be found in the traditional view that a state offended by another state's use of force can -if the offending state refuses to make amends -take "proportionate" reprisals. See INGRID DETTER DE LuPIS, THE LAW OF WAR 75 (1987) . Evidence of the rule of proportionality can also be found in Article 4 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Similarly, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that in time of war or other public emergency, contracting parties may derogate from the provisions, on the condition of rules of proportionality. And the American Convention on Human Rights allows at Article 27(1) such derogations "in time of war, public danger or other emergency which threatens the independence or security of a party" on condition of proportionality.
51. Pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, civilians are "persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art [Vol. 13:3 ASSASSINATING SADDAM HUSSEIN Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Muj ahedine-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians.
Iraq shelters several prominent Palestinian terrorist organizations in Baghdad, including the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), which is known for aerial attacks against Israel and is headed by Abu Abbas, who carried out the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and murdered U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. 58 Iraq shelters the Abu Nidal Organization, an international terrorist organization that has carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people. Targets have included the United States and several other Western nations. Each of these groups has offices in Baghdad and receives training, logistical assistance and financial aid from the government of Iraq.
In April 2002, Saddam Hussein increased from $10,000 to $25,000 the money offered to families of Palestinian suicide/homicide bombers. The rules for rewarding suicide/homicide bombers are strict and insist that only someone who blows himself up with a belt of explosives gets the full payment. Payments are made on a strict scale, with different amounts for wounds, disablement, death as a "martyr" and $25,000 for a suicide bomber ....
Former Iraqi military officers have described a highlysecret training facility in Iraq where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage and assassinations. 59 58. This PLO murder of an American in a wheelchair led to a case in U.S. federal court holding that the PLO fails to meet the internationally-accepted definition of a state. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991 ) citing National Petrochemical Co. v. M.T. Stolt Sheaf, 860 F. 2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988 ) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989 , (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHEFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES, Sec. 201 (1987) ). In Klinghoffer, the PLO characterized itself as "the embodiment of the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people ... " and "The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be." Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 46-47. The court considered these assertions as further evidence that the PLO lacked the requisite characteristics of a state. 
